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Introduction 
Will Eurasia’s “unifying wind blow from the east or the west?”1 With the fall of the Berlin 
Wall between Europe and Asia, the United States anticipated that Russia and China would adopt 
a Western model of democracy.2 Instead, they have risen as two distinct poles, and their ascension 
makes possible a move away from Western influence as the globe turns toward Eurasia: a new 
melding of East and West in which neither is dominant. The first quarter of political scientist Bruno 
Maçães’ 2019 publication, The Dawn of Eurasia, explores this turn and details the emergent 
supercontinent Eurasia, Russia and China’s role in shaping it, and what preceded this shift. While 
the latter part of the book focuses on the cultural implications of considering Eurasia its own entity, 
the first quarter delves into the theoretical background that makes this Europe and Asia pairing 
unprecedented and crucial to understand in today’s political landscape. Maçães argues that beyond 
general integration, the world has stepped into the next stage of globalization, which is inherently 
unstable due to an increasing juxtaposition of different cultures and civilizations that muddle the 
geopolitics of Europe and Asia. He goes on to say that this new moment has made a shift in power 
towards the East possible and attractive, teasing out how Russia and China continue to shape the 
Eurasian landmass. 
    An emergent Eurasia, as illustrated in the 
adjacent map, raises significant new questions for 
international relations that center on geopolitics as it 
relates to political and economic integration.3  In the 
new world, dominance and reciprocity must be used in 
tandem if the West is to keep up. Ultimately, Maçães 
argues that the current "artificial separation between 
Europe and Asia cannot hold in a globalized world,” 
and while his argument that the two continents will 
become one political and economic unit in the next 
twenty years is convincing, his assertion that it will 
most likely adopt a new, vaguely-defined set of 
universal values crafted by Russia and China is 
unconvincing given their human rights histories, their 
current governments, and human nature.4  
Summary of Book 
Maçães writes that geography factors heavily into global positions of power, and so 
understanding Eurasia’s geographic landscape is crucial to engaging with current shifts in 
international relations towards the East. To begin, he lends the book’s thesis a historical foundation 
by asserting that everything the United States did during the Cold War was in consideration of 
Eurasia—continually contemplating its future and determining its shape.5 He establishes that the 
question of Eurasia has long been America’s primary question, as it works to merge its relations 
 
1 Bruno Maçães, The Dawn of Eurasia (London: Penguin Books, 2019), 58. 
2 Ibid., 5. 
3 Keepscases / CC BY-SA / Desaturated, Eurasia Orthographic Projection, Map, 2018. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Eurasia_(orthographic_projection).svg. 
4 Maçães, The Dawn of Eurasia, 60. 
5 Ibid., 4. 
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with Europe, Russia, and China into one coherent strategy. These two assertions rest on the idea 
that the Cold War was inherently a conflict between Europe and Asia that set the stage for a 
present-day shift in international relations theory as ideological and territorial borders move 
around. Maçães goes on to say that today’s key consideration is that the globe has moved to the 
next stage of globalization: one in which borders are diffusing, but cultural and civilizational 
differences are not, creating “a permanently unstable compound” of conflicting elements.6  
    This tension between geographic space and cultural practice has given rise to a permanent 
state of instability coupled with interconnectedness, which Maçães calls the Eurasian age. Political 
scholar Nadège Rolland agrees with this, stating that there is an “increasingly deep condominium” 
between both Europe and Asia, and on a smaller scale: Russia and China.7 Both countries look in 
the same direction for the future, seeking increased Eurasian integration and global primacy. While 
they have separate tactics, such as Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union or China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative, both are in pursuit of the aforementioned common aims, allowing the two to draw 
together both Europe and Asia by creating political and economic ties through their initiatives.8 
Maçães writes that this new world order, where power is progressively balanced between East and 
West, is similar to the last thirty years’ in that it “believes in the inevitability of interdependency 
and connectivity,” but that it adds to that a “recognition of division and conflict.”9 He seems to 
believe that Asia will be the predominant entity in this next age of globalization, stating that it is 
“almost a truism to say that our century will be an Asian century” because of the rapidly growing 
economies in China, Japan, and India. 10 However, he clarifies that ‘Eurasian’ is a more fitting title 
for this age because the world is increasingly composite, a place in which “different visions of 
political order are intermixed and forced to live together.”11  
    The first quarter of the book’s main 
argument is that Eurasia  in its very 
nature, conveys that parts of the world 
no longer embrace European rules and 
ideas, suggesting that the European 
world order has failed to maintain its 
primacy and thus has come to an end, 
though it continues to influence how the 
world works. 12  This reorienting is 
another example of the next stage of 
globalization and necessitates a change 
in Europe’s rigid strategies if it is not to 
be left behind. Further, Maçães argues 
that Eurasia, as shown in relation to the 
United States and Canada on this map, 
13   has escaped much of the scope of 
 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 Nadège Rolland, “A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia,” Survival 61, no. 1 (2019): 7. 
8 Ibid., 19. 
9 Maçães, The Dawn of Eurasia, 5. 
10 Ibid., 1. 
11 Ibid., 2. 
12 Ibid., 12. 
13 United States Central Intelligence Agency, East Asia and Oceania, Map, Washington, D.C.: Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2002. https://www.loc.gov/item/2002627531/. 
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America’s influence. 14  However, he remarks that this is now changing as President Donald 
Trump’s current foreign policy seems to align more with models offered in Asia, pivoting the 
United States towards Eurasia: Trump’s “main concern - which was the main concern of Trump 
the businessman - is to be able to compete with the new sources of economic power in the 
world…adapting to their methods - even adopting them at times.”15  
    While American foreign policy evolves on the perimeter, Maçães suggests that Eurasia is 
primarily shaped by Russia, China, and the European Union’s (EU) competing visions for future 
global dominance. He writes that Russia sees the future as a place of permanent rivalry and 
competition in which power must be taken, China sees it as an age where its foreign policy goals 
of influence can be accomplished through economic strength, and the EU hopes to maintain the 
status quo of its own primacy through the application of rules to complex sociopolitical issues.16 
As Maçães states: “sovereignty in our time is no longer expressed by the image of the impregnable 
fortress. It is open to the world, it is the will to participate in all the global exchanges with an open 
mind….”17 The heart of his argument is that deep Eurasian integration will result in heightened 
modern conflict as attempts are made to meld together Western and Eastern ways of thinking, but 
that Russia and China’s economic expansion towards Central Asia and Europe will accomplish a 
new kind of global collaboration. Maçães holds that this pairing will change the face of modern 
politics by shifting the power of influence away from Europe, making it “no more than a peripheral 
peninsula” in a new world order whose defining features remain hazy.18 
Critique and Analysis of Argument 
Maçães’ thesis of the increasing importance of Eurasian integration is convincing and 
clarifies the implications of globalization for international relations and the global power dynamic 
in general. He rightfully shows that the issue is personal and affects each individual by pointing 
out that Russia and China are actively working towards increasing their influence through 
accumulation of territory in Russia’s case and economic dominance in China’s case. These tactics 
have far-reaching political ramifications that can now be seen in the EU’s faltering organizational 
structure and the Unites States’ changing economic policy. Russia and China’s actions inherently 
seek to disrupt the current norms of international relations, which are largely Western-centric. So 
far, these two countries have been successful: the globe’s economy and thus its politics have moved 
towards the East for the past thirty years and continue to do so.19 Maçães accurately notes that this 
shift towards the East is accelerated by the EU’s failure to maintain order amidst growing chaos 
within and outside its borders from crises such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea, an influx of 
refugees into Europe, and Greece’s financial crisis. The latter resulted in Greece’s eventual move 
away from the EU in 2018 towards an opportunity to make its port in Athens, Piraeus, a key point 
of trade between Europe and Asia in China’s Belt and Road Initiative: a pioneering investment 
plan that seeks to link Asia, Africa, and Europe.20  This initiative flows from China’s belief, 
articulated by President Xi Jinping, that it should be the one to guide the world in shaping a new 
 
14 Maçães, The Dawn of Eurasia, 260 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 40. 
17 Ibid., 39. 
18 Ibid., 60. 
19 Ibid., 260. 
20 Jens Bastian, “Southeast European Crossroads in China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Südosteuropa-
Mitteilungen, no. 1 (2019): 39. 
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world order that is “more just and 
reasonable” in a time of multipolarity 
and economic globalization.21 This map 
from one of China’s government 
agencies, the National Development and 
Reform Commission, illustrates what the 
Belt and Road’s two-pronged route 
might eventually look like as China 
pushes forward. 22 
  Significantly, Maçães’ 
arguments throughout this section of the 
book ring true as they flow from the 
international relations theories of realism 
and liberalism. Russia seeks influence 
through hard power in Europe, exampled 
in its invasion of Ukraine,23 because it operates under realism, a theory that asserts that one’s 
sovereignty must be maintained and strengthened by leveraging power for the state’s self-
interest.24 China operates under the theory of liberalism as it seeks more influence by increasing 
its economic cooperation and interaction with other nations on the world stage.25 The tactics 
diverge, but both models threaten the EU’s position of power because they thrive in opportunities 
that spring from a chaotic world order, whereas the EU relies on predictable political and economic 
exchanges that fit into its ordered system of rules. While the EU is not a sovereign power, Maçães 
regards its influence on the European peninsula as similar to the influence which Russia and China 
exert on the Asian landmass—resulting in the lines he draws between the three entities.    
    Maçães’ arguments have the strength of not asserting what cannot be generally known. He 
writes with humility in saying that while the concept of a coming Eurasia makes sense politically 
and economically based on the changing norms, he “cannot predict…what it will look like” and 
questions whether the “unifying wind will blow from the east or the west.”26 What can be known, 
however, is that while the world is continuously reshaped and its future is uncertain, history does 
repeat: Maçães accurately recognizes that the new dichotomy in international relations that he 
describes “between system and environment replicates almost exactly the old one between a 
supposedly rational and orderly European civilization and the chaos of the Asian steppes.”27 This 
broader perspective is brought in throughout the book and the combined view of Eurasia’s 
divergent past with its melded present strengthens Maçães’ view of its future. The book’s other 
strengths are his balanced approach to stating the goals of both Russia and China, as well as the 
 
21 Ibid., 127. 
22 China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Belt and Road Portal, Map, 2019. 
https://en.ndrc.gov.cn, retrieved from https://www.thelocal.it/20190322/chinese-president-in-italy-to-sign-silk-road-
deal. 
23 Vsevolod Samokhalov, “Ukraine between Russia and the European Union: Triangle Revisited,” Europe-
Asia Studies 67, no. 9 (2015): 1381. 
24 Joshua S. Goldsterin and Jon C. W. Pevehouse, International Relations, (Hoboken, NJ: Pearson, 2020), 
36.  
25 Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, Essentials of International Relations, (New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2019), 83. 
26 Maçães, The Dawn of Eurasia, 58. 
27 Ibid., 232. 
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space he takes to look at Europe’s historic role as a key global influence. He breaks down technical 
terms like geopolitics and makes his arguments accessible by stating that the crux of his argument 
sits in the fact that the world’s borders are rapidly dissolving even as cultural practice and nuance 
increases—particularly along Asia’s artificial border with Europe. Thus, Maçães is effective at 
conveying the relevance of this issue with modern international relations. His work is appropriately 
speculative and well-researched, providing a timely analytical lens for the future.  
    Where Maçães’ argument of Eurasian integration and future world dominance breaks down 
is his assertion that it will likely, and most fittingly, be governed by unspecified  “universal values” 
made up by Russia and China for the modern age.28 This idealistic assertion captures a faulty idea 
at the core of his argument: what is right and inevitable for the future is that which fits the global 
scene best, regardless of plausibility or morality. This is inaccurate, as it follows a view of the 
world that believes humanity is always progressing. Maçães suggests that man in his finite 
knowledge can eventually create a new model to live under that will be universally beneficial 
across two continents and serve as an example to the world. He insinuates that, in the future, man 
can learn from his mistakes and leave behind self-interest for himself and his nation long enough 
to create globally unifying values, despite this having never before been possible. 
    Maçães writes that this model might arise from Russian and Chinese collaboration, despite 
the fact that the histories of both these nations are stained with flagrant human rights violations 
and overreaching governments, with little sign of change in present times. His vision of 
universality is vague and springs from what he has heard from academics in China who say they 
are “developing values that can appeal to every human being: some version of development and 
well-being that can be readily understood and assimilated by every nation on the planet in a way 
that democracy and human rights cannot.”29 International relations scholar Natalia Eremina states 
that the view of a universalized civilization “is an ideal and it cannot be realized.”30 She holds that 
since European civilization has lost its former attractiveness due to its various financial crises, “the 
modern world is not unified by the one dominant civilization power.”31 This leaves a vacuum that 
enables Eurasia to gain influence and “become a platform for cooperation of different nations, 
cultures, and states.”32 Accordingly, universality is not possible because no one entity stands at the 
helm of the globe’s civilizations, and arguably, no entity could—humanity is and always has been 
self-serving with diverse visions for how society should be oriented. Civilizations rise and fall in 
relation to the fluctuating needs of different cultures, religions, and geographic locations. Thus, 
Eremina’s statement that “in the future there will be a world of different civilizations that will have 
to learn to coexist with the others” aligns with what can be known from history’s mosaic of human 
experience, which often skews towards a moral downward spiral rather than a straight line of 
progress.33 Her assertion is therefore more plausible than Maçães’ prediction. While humanity and 
the globe’s rising state powers may try to create universal values that seem good to the individual, 
ultimately it is a morality centered on truth and absolute values which must be returned to if the 
world is ever to pivot towards a sustainable state of peace. 
 
28 Ibid., 58. 
29 Ibid., 52. 
30 Natalia Eremina. “Advent of a New Civilization Project: Eurasia in – U.S. out?,” Journal of Eurasian 
Studies 7, no. 2 (2016): 169. 
31 Ibid., 170. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 169. 
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Conclusion 
In the first quarter of Dawn of Eurasia, Maçães predicts that Europe and Asia’s artificially 
established border will dissolve entirely, allowing for the rise of Eurasia—a new geopolitical space 
to be explored through international relations theory and practice. Maçães successfully makes his 
argument by illuminating the steps that Russia and China are taking to further their integration 
with each other and the world, and the power that both are capable of as they utilize realism and 
liberalism in their interactions with other states. However, while his thesis that Europe and Asia 
will become one political and economic unit is convincing, his view that it will most likely operate 
under a new set of universal values created by Russia and China is a poor point that overreaches. 
The suggestion that two countries with problematic human rights records and authoritarian 
governments can come together to create a new moral world order is idealistic, improbable, and a 
faulty hope for the future.34 Despite this flaw in Maçães’ argument, the portions of this book that 
delve into analyzing the concept of Eurasia are well written, the ideas are accessible, and his stance 
is humble enough to allow that the world will unfold and shift its shape in the coming decades in 
ways that may not align with his predictions.  
 
  
 
34 Thomas Ambrosio, “Authoritarian Norms in a Changing International System,” Politics and 
Governance, 6, no. 2 (2015): 122. 
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